

SECRETExecutive Registry
79-2139HANDLE VIA
TALENT-KEYHOLE
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

22 September 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with the Secretary of Defense,
21 September 1979 (U)

1. The Secretary raised the question of the space shuttle management and whether there is a need for a separate DoD control facility. He said he was concerned that the NFIP might get saddled for the dollars for this. He believes the Air Force should pay for it and it is his intention that they do so. He wanted to know how I felt about it. I told him that I generally felt we needed a separate DoD control facility; that I had not dug into that exhaustively, however, since it appeared to me it wasn't going to be our budgetary decision; but that I would support having such a facility if DoD paid for it. (C)

2. The Secretary requested a study on the possibilities afforded to the United States of publicizing the problems which there have been with Soviet military aid to a number of third world countries, e.g., the Nigerian air force is disenchanted with the training they have received from the Soviets. In short, if we can determine why the Soviets bombed out in some of these countries, could we turn it to our advantage in one way or another? (S)

3. The Secretary also would like to know whether we can identify that the Soviets are propagandizing through various groups in Europe against the tactical nuclear modernization problem. In short, if we can identify the organizations which are providing support to the communist position on this [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] it might help the situation. I told him I thought we would probably have difficulty identifying the method in which the Soviets were operating against TNF modernization that precisely. [REDACTED]

(S)

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4. The Secretary asked if we could identify Castro's covert actions in Latin America sufficiently to publicize them to the countries involved. He had the impression that Castro is working inside governments like Panama and Costa Rica without the knowledge of those governments. He said this would be a follow-on to an arrangement that has been made for Pete Vaky to take an Agency study on the Soviet-Cuban relationship and after some sanitization to pass it on to the free governments in the Central American area--I didn't know we had any such program going, do we?

I told the Secretary again that I doubted that we had been able to identify the Cuban covert action infrastructure or methodology very specifically.

[REDACTED]

5. The Secretary asked if there was any new news on the progress of the NFIP; had we any more discussions with OMB that indicated trends there? I said no, there was nothing since our Presidential decision on the guideline figure. (C)

6. I discussed the move of the Collection Tasking Staff to the Pentagon. I gave him my reasons for not wanting to do it. I said that we would leave the three-man staff that was already there, but I hoped I would be able to get the office I'd asked for as a contingency location and that he would nominate a three-star officer to be Zellmer's deputy. He didn't think he could offer a three-star officer, but he would offer a two-star.

He was very reluctant to see the move discontinued and told Graham Claytor to try to resolve the Memorandum of Understanding in space location for the DCI issues that remain unresolved. I told him, and later Claytor, that it was not just these issues but the fact that it had taken a year and one-half of teethpulling to get even to this point of disagreement. He asked to get back to me in a few days. I told him I had only until Wednesday of next week to cancel the contract we had let for GSA to rehabilitate the space in the Pentagon. He indicated he might be willing to fund this on a contingency for the future basis. (S)

7. I raised the question of D/Space Systems, Air Force. The Secretary suggested that Hans Mark would keep some overall responsibility for space activities. I suggested that we wait until after the President's decisions on the '81 budget before making the transfer. He indicated he would look into that. (S)

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25X1A *called*
[redacted]
8. We had a long discussion on [redacted] He is concerned that too many people who are interested are getting sensitive intelligence as opposed to too many people who need to use it, and particularly he feels that the military commanders who need to use it are not getting it sometimes whereas people in Washington who are just interested do get it.

25X1D
I made the pitch that [redacted] would help us restrict the amount of material in the codeword system by decompartmenting a great deal of it and tightening up on that which remained in the codeword system. He agreed with this theory but expressed reservations on decompartmenting COMINT. I gave the papers I had to him and Graham Claytor and we will talk about it again. (S)

25X1A *called*
[redacted]
10. We talked about Cuba. He was interested in whether there was evidence that the Soviets were trying to be more secretive in Cuba than elsewhere where they had training activities, e.g., Eastern Europe. I told him I thought they were being secretive but I had had no basis of comparison. (S)

25X1D *called*
[redacted]
11. I asked for his support on the export licenses [redacted] He asked Graham Claytor to look into this and thought we should try to turn the Air Force around. (S)

25X1A
25X1D
[redacted]
14. I made a pitch for [redacted] He indicated he would look into it. (S)

25X1A *called*
[redacted]
15. I covered the tactical nuclear forces issues in the briefing paper during our previous discussion on possible covert actions in this area. He thought the points were well taken and was quite concerned if the blue-red briefing was not going to be in line with what we are going to come up with in the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum. (S)

16. I did not get to any of the other items as we ran out of time. (U)

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STANSFIELD TURNER
Director [redacted]

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TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
4			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
REMARKS:			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.			DATE

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(Security Classification)

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Paragraph 13
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(Security Classification)

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TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE
1	DCI		X	
2	DDCI		X	
3	DD/RM	1	5,6,7,12,13	
4	DD/NFA	2,10	3,15	
5	DD/CT	12	6,13	
6	DD/A		6	
7	DD/O	2,3,4	10,11,14	
8	DD/S&T		1,7,11,12,13	
9	GC			
10	LC			
11	IG			
12	Compt		1,5,6,12	
13	D/PA			
14	D/EEO			
15	D/Pers			
16	AQ/DCI			
17	C/IPS			
18	PB/NSC	X	<i>Tis</i>	
19			2,3,4	
20	SA/DCI	8		
21				
22	ES		X	

SUSPENSE DATE:

Remarks:

Paragraphs for action/information
extracted as noted above.

21 September 1979

Agenda for
21 September 1979 Meeting
with SecDef, 1700Z

Memorandum for the Record of your 8 August 1979 meeting.

TAB

SUBJECT

Move to Pentagon

DNRO

General Items

Cuba

- (1) SSCI Staff interview re: Cuba reporting (Not Covered)
- (2) DOD's list of possible US actions (Not Covered)
- (3) DCI list of possible retaliatory actions (Not Covered)

MBFR

Program

U-2: Turkey and SALT II Verification

Afghanistan - brief SecDef on:

- (1) Probable airborne unit
- (2) Number of Soviet troops
- (3) Loss of [REDACTED] - impact

DOD briefing on TNF - numbers in briefing not "straight" on red side

Pak - You may want to alert SecDef on possible Pak test - talking points enclosed

China/N. Korea trade with S. Korea - handout to SecDef

Establishment of Tactical Cryptological Program - "FYI" in case
SecDef raises subject - raises issue of transfers into and out of NFIPVietnam - You may want to note we expect an offensive and the 2X
buildup of combat troops